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CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

__ .... 1. Appellant, the manager of a Jacksonville drive-in, commenced

4U'~a,wu

~~~

an action in Fla. state court seeking to have a city ordinance

~~~ prohibiting

t...

nudity in drive-in motion pictures declared violative

~
of the First Amendment. The trial ct denied relief and the Dist
~ of Appeal affirmed citing a CA 5 case reaching the same result.
~~ ' T y :la:Sup Ct denied cert by a vote of 4-3.
~

~·

2.

acts:

A Jacksonville ordinance makes it unlawful for a drive-in
~

~ ~ t:
"any motion picture ... in which the human male or female bare
~
h~ buttocks, human bare breasts, or human male or female bare pubic
~ ~~
' areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit

.,

-2-

is visible from any __ public street or public lace. Violation
oft is sect1on snail e punis a e as a Class C offense ••• "
In March, 1972, appellant was served with a summons charging him
with violating this ordinance by showing a

film~-

"Class of '74."

[The nature or contents of the film are not discussed in the
papers]

Pursuant to stipulation between appellant and the City,

the prosecution was continued indefin.i tely in order to allow
appellant to bring an action in state court testing the ordinance's
constitutionality.
In affirming the trial court's holding that the ordinance was
constitutional, the Dist Ct of Appeal cited only Chemline, Inc.
v. City of Grand Prarie, 364 Fo2d 721 (CA 5, 1966)(Rives, Brown,
1

~

Moore, CA 2 by desig).

In Chemline, CA 5 upheld a similar

ordinance stating that it was
"almost self-evident that a city is well within its legitimate
police powers in enacting reasonable ordinances to protect children
in its public streets and highways from viewing 'bare buttocks or
bare female breasts, or striptease, burlesque or nudist-type scenes
which constitute the main or primary material." 364 F .2d at 724.
3. Contentions:

Appellant argues that the ordinance is violative

of the First Amendment in that it proscribes protected, non-obscend
speech.

He relies heavily on a recent CA 7 decision, Cinecom

Theatres Midwest States, Inc., v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297,
(1973)(Duffy, Kiley, Campbell) where an identical city ordinance
was declared violative of treFirst Amendment.

CA 7 reasoned that

protection of children might permit a variable standard of

obscenit~

but did not permit a blanket declaration that all exhibitions of
~----~

public nudity, regardless of context, were prescribable under the
guise of protecting minors.

"

-.J-

CA 7 concluded:
"Althou gh a city possess the authority to regulate this industry
for the protection of its children from exposure to material obscene
as. to them, the ordinance here is much broader than that permissible
objective and therefore runs afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 473 F.2d 1302
Although it recognized minor factual distinctions with Chemline, CA 7
expressly declined to follow the reasoning of Chemline. Appellant
also relies on Cohen v. California and several state court decisions
invalidating similar ordinances.
In a rather cryptic response,

appellee dismisses the asserted

conflict between Chemline and Cinecom by stating "neither of these
cases are under review here."

It defends the statute as a proper

--

exercise of the city's police power to abate public
4o Discussion:

nuisance~.

If the Court is interested in resolving the question

of whether non-obscene nudity shown in a drive-in can be proscribed
this is probably a good case.
widespread.

The conflict seems clear and fairly

The Court heard argument in a case two years ago,

Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972), where the owner of a drive-in
was convicted for showing non-obscene movies containing nudity unqek
'

the Wash. state obscenity statute.

The Court unanimously reversed

the conviction on the ground tht the state statute did not give
notice
that a lesser standard of "obscenity" would be employed
,.
for drive-in type movies.

- The Court explicitly preterrnitrLed

the question of whether a lower standard could be proper. In
a concurring opinion, the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
stated that he had "no doubt" that a properly drafted state statute
directed at nudity in drive-ins would be constitutional.

-4-

Aside from the narrow issue of how far a sta te can regulat e
a drive-in under .a nuisance theory, the case presents the broade r
question of what

limits, if any, can be placed on the state's

regulation of obscenity for the protection of children.

The basic

questions would seem to be left unresolved by Miller-Hamling.
There is a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
8/1/74
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein
No. 73-1942

DATE:

December 26, 1974

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

This is a rather trivial case regarding a municipal
ordinance barring all nudity at drive-in movie theatres
that are visible from public streets or places.

I have

checked the record and the theatre in question is plainly
visible from several adjacent streets and homes.

The appellee

city admits that the material is not obscene under Miller
but argues that it may be proscribed as a

~uisance

because

the theatre is visible to the unwilling passerby and because
it attracts children.
I

do not have much trouble with the case.

All that

is required of theatre owners is to insure that their screens

-----"'--

-

-........._

..___

-

--------

are not visible outside of the theatre.
~---....._

Subject to this

----.._

condition the state is perfectly willing to allow these m9vies
to be shown.

Thus, there is no effort at content

and no real First Amendment issue at stake.

/UG~c~
c~o1

In short, the

statute is akin to a time, place and manner regulation that,
in my view, is eminently reasonable.

To the extent that

the city seeks to "censor" material, it does

s~th

respect

to minors, and under the Court's opinion in Ginsberg v.

2.
New York, authored by Justice Brennan, this sort of regulation of minors is allowed.*

J.K.

ss

*Appellant relies principally on California v. Cohen, the
vulgar language case. He claims that the drive-in does not
present a "captive audience" problem and notes that in
Cohen children were able to witness the vulgar words. Whatever you may think of Cohen, it is so readily distin uishable
that it will present no problem in this case.
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No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
'•·

..

•.,,

Dear Chief:

•;

Sally Smith and Joel Klein have persuaded me that
it's OK for kids to look at bare breasts and bare buttocks
',.

•'

and accordingly I reverse my vote.

"

...!. ...
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CHAMB E RS OF

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR .

No. 73-1942

March 1, 197 5

Erznoznik v. Jacksonville

Dear Chief:
As indicated at the Conference on yesterday, I was
prepared to vote - and did vote tentatively - to sustain
the Jacksonville ordinance. The discussion at Conference
prompted me to reexamine my position. I will now vote to
reverse.
· This is not an obscenity case. I had viewed it as a
"time - and-place" type of regulation of drive-in theaters,
a type ordinance which would be entirely valid if properly
drawn. The difficulty with the Jacksonville ordinance, as
I now view it, is that its purpose is ambiguous.
If designed to prevent the "nuisance" of traffic delay
and accidents, the prohibition would not have been limited
to exposures of the human body. Persons (and especially
teenagers) using public streets and sidewalks would be
equally diverted by some of the horror and crime scenes
r egularly portrayed on the movie screens. Similarly, if
the purpose of the ordinance was to protect privacy, it
would not have been limited to visibility from public stree~s
or public places. The evidence includes a complaint by a
private family because the screen was visible from their
residence. Cinecom Theatres v. Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297,
1307 (CA7 1973) is directly in point on the privacy issue.
As the ordinance is neither protective of privacy nor
rationally tailored to promote traffic safety, its real
purpose seems to be directed only at the exhibition - in
public view - of all scenes in which the described areas of
the human body may be visible. This, I am now persuaded,

- 2 -

is an impermissible form of censorship, going beyond the
obscenity standards applicable to minors as articulated
in our cases.
Also, the ordinance has elements of vagueness. The
operator of a drive-in theater would have a difficult time
deciding how much of a "human female bare breast" could
be exposed in a film without subjecting himself to criminal
penalty. Conversely, a wide range of discretion would be
vested in the prosecutorial authorities.
As I reread the miserable briefs filed by appellant
and appellee in this case, and recalled the low quality
of the oral argument, I was reminded of the appropriateness of your comments in Chicago last week as to the
shockingly low level of advocacy to which we are frequently
subjected.
Sincerely,

-

J..t

f
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

No. 73-1942

March 1, 197 5

Erznoznik v. Jacksonville

Dear Chief:
As indicated at the Conference on yesterday, I was
prepared to vote - and did vote tentatively - to sustain
the Jacksonville ordinance. The discussion at Conference
prompted me to reexamine my position. I will now vote to
reverse.
This is not an obscenity case. I had viewed it as a
"time-and-place" type of regulation of drive-in theaters,
a type ordinance which would be entirely valid if properly
drawn. The difficulty with the Jacksonville ordinance, as
I now view it, is that its purpose is ambiguous.
If designed to prevent the "nuisance" of traffic delay
and accidents, the prohibition would not have been limited
to exposures of the human body. Persons (and especially
teenagers) using public streets and sidewalks would be
equally diverted by. some of the horror and crime scenes
r egularly portrayed on the movie screens. Similarly, if
the purpose of the ordinance was to protect privacy, it
would not have been limited to visibility from public streets
or public places. The evidence includes a complaint by a
private family because the screen was visible from their
residence. Cinecom Theatres v. Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297,
1307 (CA7 1973) is directly in point on the privacy issue.
As the ordinance is neither protective of privacy nor
rationally tailored to promote traffic safety, its real
purpose seems to be directed only at the exhibition - in
public view - of all scenes in which the described areas of
the human body may be visible. This, I am now persuaded,

- 2 is an impermissible form of censorship, going beyond the
obscenity standards applicable to minors as articulated
in our cases.
Also, the ordinance has elements of vagueness. The
operator of a drive-in theater would have a difficult time
deciding how much of a "human female bare breast" could
be exposed in a film without subjecting himself to criminal
penalty. Conversely, a wide range of discretion would be
vested in the prosecutorial authorities.
As I reread the miserable briefs filed by appellant
and appellee in this case, and recalled the low quality
of the oral argument, I was reminded of the appropriateness of your comments in Chicago last week as to the
shockingly low level of advocacy to which we are frequently
subjected.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

March 3, 1975

No. 73-1942

Erznoznik v. Jacksonville

Dear Bill:
I will be happy to write for the Court in this case,
and thank you for the opportunity - now that I've seen the
light and changed my initial tentative vote.
Sih.cerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

March 3, 1975

No. 73-1942

Erznoznik v. Jacksonville

I will be happy to write for the Court in this case,
and thank you for the opportunity - now that I've seen the
light and changed my tnitial tentative vote •

..

Sincerely,

...

.~

'·

Mr. Justice Brennan

'

"

lfp/ss

.•

,,

'

,·

..
"-·-···''"'"'"' "'-''--· J.'1,.,.,.._,..'.. ,,_,

I'

f

.*u:prrnu cqllurl of tire 'Jfutittb .:§tlilig
~CU'f'frbtgi:on. tiJ.

<!f.

20.?>!-~

I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ....

J . BRENNAN, JR .

March 3, 1975

RE: No. 73-1942

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

Dear Chief:
This is to confirm that I have assigned the
opinion in the above to Lewis.

Sincerely,
.l'j '

;~ .(
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mr. Joel Klein

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 24, 1975

No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
Having spent most of the day reviewing your draft of
3/21, including reading of a number of the cases cited, I
am reinforced in the wisdom of reconsidering my tentative
review that the ordinance could be sustained.

Your draft,

.·

which is well organized and analyzed, seems unanswerable although able lawyers always find some answer.
I have performed my usual personal editing.

Some of

this is pure form and trivial, although I have made some
changes in emphasis and nuances.

·,

As you put this through another draft, consider the

.

.

following points:
1.

Although I have never written about the "right of

privacy", I place a rather high premium on personal privacy
and want to be careful what we say.

In this connection, does

Justice White have anything in his recent
may be quotable in a note?

£2! opinion that

,.

I have added in note 4 a quote

from the Chief Justice's opinion Rowan, to the effect that
rights of privacy must be balanced against rights of expression.
I believe this is correct.

.,..

If you find a better reference or

quote, you might add it in note 4 or even in the text.

·'

,·,'·

.

..
...

~

2.
2.

I also want to be especially careful not to go

overboard in proclaiming First Amendment rights for children
of all ages.

You will recall whet we said in Goss, in which

we quoted Potter Stewart's concurrence in Tinker.

I would

rather like to quote Stewart again in a note which makes the
point that the age of minors is a relevant factor.

I feel

quite differently, as you know, about a freshman in college

~.

•.

·than I do a fifth grader.
3.

A still further sensitive area with me is the

doctrine of overbreadth.

The draft discusses this in Part III,

and generally is in line with my thoughts.

I would appreciate

it, nevertheless, if you took a further careful look at Part III

...

Bear in mind that Justice White, writing in Broadrick, intended
and he felt strongly about this - to rechannel the overbrdadth
~

doctrine into narrower limits.

Justice White may well be

writing a dissent in this case.

I would like to give him

..

as small a target as possible.
)'

4.

All of us have agreed that a municipal ordinance

directed at traffic safety validly could proscribe all moving
picture screens visible from public streets.

I would like to

say this, in substance in an appropriately located footnote.
On

page 12 you cite some old friends which have given

me a certain amount of trouble:

Coates, Gooding and Lewis.

Although these are now established precedents, which I will
follow when I have no other choice, I do not wish unnecessarily
to dignify the full sweep of these opinions.

Perhaps you

3.
could find other cases to compare with
and omit Gooding altogether.

~

and Chaplinsky

If this is not feasible, I

could be persuaded to leave these cases in the opinion although I know that they will be especially difficult for

\'

,•

Justice Blackmun to "take'' as I think he dissented in all of
them.

* *** *

.

-·

I will not be able to get back to this case before
Thursday.

I suggest that you continue the editing process,

working with Penny, with the view to giving me another
draft on Thursday.
printer.

I would like to clear it then for the

•,

As you may recall, I have a speaking commitment

at Northwestern Law School in Portland, Oregon, and will
leave the Court on April 3, returning April 7.

'·

I would

like to circulate this before I go.
<

.. '
•

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

'I.J'

' •.

··.
..

,'
(

''

'
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/

2ngr~~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR .

April 2, 1975

•'

RE : No . 73-1942 Erznoznik, etc . v. City of Jacksonville

Dear Lewis:
I am happy to join your very fine opinion in the

above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

r.

-""-"'

,ju.vrttttt Qfltnd ltf tqt ~b ,jhttts
1llaslfiughtn. ~. C!f. 2ll~'l-~

)

CHAMBERS OF

April 2, 1975

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 73-1942 --Richard Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~~
....
T. M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

;

,.

,jup:rtmt Q}ourlcf tlrt ~th jfattg

'Jila,gfrhtghm. ~. (!}.

21lp'f.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 2, 1975

No. 73-1942 - Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.hprmu <!Jottrl.rf tJ.r.t ~ttittb' _.fat.tg
._zwftittgtou:. J. <!J. 2llp_,.$
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

April 11, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1942 -

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

.§u:punu tq' ourl of Urt 'Jjt.nift b .§hili.1l'

'Jllcurlyin¢lllt.lfl. <q. 2D~,t~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

May 22, 1975

Dear Lewis:
Please

jo~n

me in 73-1942,

.,

ERZNOZNIK v. JACKSONVILLE.

LJOi)

Iff

...

WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~ ••

I

.:§u:putttt Qfltltrlllf tqt ~tti:ttb .:§t

'Jltufrittghm. ~·

ar.

g

2llp~~

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 16, 1975

Re:

No. 73-1942 - Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

June 18, 1975
,.

case Held for No. 73-1942 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

No. 73-1176

106 1 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop

This petition was held for Erznoznik because petitioner
had challenged, inter alia, a city ordinance prohibiting an
adult movie theatre from locating within 200 yards of a
church. Although petitioner pressed this point in district
court, it apparently did not raise it on appeal and does not
present it in the petition. Accordingly Erznoznik has no
bearing on the petition.
The two ~. !ssues that petitioner does raise pertain to
an ordinance vaguely similar to the licensing revocation
statute challenged in No. 73-296 Huffman v. Pursue.
Petitioner claims that the ordinance effects an unconstitutional
prior restraint, and that its procedures are constitutionally
inadequate. In view of the fact that petitioner filed the
instant complaint in federal court, his state licensing
revocation hearing has been sit;q,yml. As a result it is not
clear whether, if indeed the license is eventually revoked,
it will be on the basis of the zoning provision concerning
adult theatres or on the basis of the previous showing of
obscene movies. Nor is it clear from the petition what
procedures will be used to process the case at the
administrative hearing and on judicial review.
With the case in this tentative and very confused posture,
I will vote to deny.

...

,:

,· ...

l'

;

.·

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

'

'·

June 19, 1975

...

No. 73·1942

Erznoznik v. Jacksonville

Dear Mr. Putzel:
The line-up in the above case is as follows:

Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
joined.

Douglas, J., ,filed a concurring opinion.

Burger,

..

C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Which lehnquist, J.,
joined.

White, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

SiDcerely,

Mr. Henry Putzel, jr.

lfp/ss
cc:

-,

Mr. Comio

....

v

._v

,_,

.u ....

,bb

.I....ILU-.IL1\J~L1..LL'-

V •

V

..L.L .L

V,L;

V~VL'\..WV.L'

V ..LL.J.LJ.LI

A Jacksonville, Florida ordinance, directed at
drive-in movie theaters, prohibits the exhibition of
films which contain nudity.

The ordinance was sustained

by the Florida courts, and came to us on appeal.
As we conclude that the ordinance infringes First
Amendment rights, we reverse the decision of the State
Court.
This is not an obscenity ordinance, as it proscribes
the showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational.
It nevertheless was defended on three grounds:

(i)

as

preventing offense to persons on public streets, (ii) protecting children from scenes of nudity, and (iii), as
a traffic measure.
In our view, the ordinance is both overbroad and
underinclusive when tested against its specified purposes.
The intrusion on privacy of passersby is limited; and
the legitimate State interest in protecting children from
obscenity is not furthered; and, if designed as a traffic

..
2.

measure, many things - such as scenes of horror and
violence - are more likely to distract than many of the
innocent and fleeting shots of nudity that are barred
by this ordinance.
In sum, although a city or state has legitimate
interests that would support a nondiscriminatory ordinance
regulating drive-in theaters, this ordinance unduly
infringes upon First Amendment rights with little prospect
of furthering any legitimate state interest.
Mr. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion.
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined.
also filed a dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice White
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ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

A Jacksonville, Florida ordinance, directed at
drive-in movie theaters, prohibits the exhibition of
fi~s

which contain nudity.

'
'.

The ordinance was sustained

~

by the Florida courts, and came to us on appeal.
As we conclude that the ordinance infringes First
Amendment rights, we reverse the decision of the State
Court.
This is not an obscenity ordinance, as it proscribes
the showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational.
It nevertheless was defended on three grounds:

(i)

as

preventing offense to persons on public streets, (ii) protecting children from seenes of nudity, and (iii), as
. •.

a traffic measure.
In our view, the

ordir~nce

is both overbroad and

underinclusive when tested against its specified purposes.
The intrusion on privacy of passersby is limited; and
the legitimate State interest in protecting children from
obscenity is not furthered; and, if designed as a traffic
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innocent and fleeting shots of nudity that are barred
by this ordinance.
In sum, although a city or state has legitimate
interests that would support a nondiscriminatory ordinance
regulating drive-in theaters, this ordinance unduly
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infringes upon First Amendment rights with little prospect
of furthering any legitimate state interest • ..··' ,
Mr. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion.
The Chie£ Justice filad a dissenting opinf.on, in
which Mr .• ' Justice Rehnquist joined.
also filed a dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice White

..

;,."-I

l.i'

'I'~
~

,

. -~ :\·-1'

;..n-· ·-i

~",.

tt·

or:(~._'' I'·'

JP
·;
l'

.,

'-\G~ ~>. ~!-IT

1-158

2-(,001LIQE175 Clc./21.1/75
lC'S

IP~If.'NCZ

western union

CSP

7028703AU7 MGM TDRN LAS VEGAS NV 100 06•2a 0007A EST
ZIP

J l ' S T H E U . \': T S

OF

T~E

r

P 0 ~ E L L J UN I 0 R ,

~AS~l~~TON

RF~A~ D l~~

P LJ 1- L I C

YOU~

nEClSION ON JACKSONVILLE' FLORIDA CONCERNING SEX AND

r i-( J V E• I r,, T1-i E A. TE RS I

Pr~TEF!Q~ 0 EGION AND MAY
RC·~f.RT E LPICClLN 5S16
00~07

S UP R01 E C0 URT

STATES
DC 205U3

~~ITfD

~"~

0 UL D L I KE T0 I ~~ VI TE Y0 U T0 KI S S MY

GOD HAVE MERCY ON YOUR SOUL
MORENDO DqiVE LAS VEGAS NEVADA

EST

"

;
r

(

'

.

"

~~F_!..
7::,

l~ I

SUPREME COURT F HE UNITED STATES
No. 73-1942
Richard Erznoznik, etc.,)
. .
On Appeal from the D1stnct
Appellant,
Court of Appeal of Florida
v.
for the First District.
City of Jacksonville.
[April -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a
Jackson ville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when
its screen is visible from a public street or place.

I
Appellant, Richard ErzPoznik, is the manager of the
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the
municipsJ code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare
breasts were shown." 1 The ordi!lance, adopted January
14, H)72, provides:
"3:30.313 Dnve-In Theaters, Films Visible From
Public Sfreets or Public Places. It shall be unlawful
• The movt-•, "CI•1,; of 'i.t,'' had bc·en rated "R" by the l'viotion
l'iclnn A~l:<oewtion ot Am< nra. \n "R" rating indieates that yuuths
may lw ndnuttPd only wh"n acromp1111it>d by a parent or ~uardian. Rce
gpm·rall~ Fnnlman. 'liw :\Totion f'icturf Hatmg System of 1968. A
Con:-;tJtntJOnal Anal~·s1~ of Rr>lf-H<•gnlatJOn by thr Film Indu~try , 73
Col L. Hrv 18,'\ (197.3)

Although there i8 nothing in the record
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any
other person connected with or employed by any
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide,
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or
public place. Violation of this section shall be punishable as a Class C offense."
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor,
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate
declaratory a.ction. In that action appellee, the city of
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was
also testimony indicating that people had been observed
watching films while sitting outs~de the theater in parked
cars and in the grass.
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights.
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida,
I
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 ( 1974), relying exclusively on
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721
( CA5 1966), which had sustained a similar ordirtance. z
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks.
2 The only other Circuit. Court of Appeals to consider this question reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatres Midwest
Stateli, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973).
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable
jurisdiction/ 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse.

II

'•

Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 ( 1973), and thus applies to films that
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains
that any movie containing nudity which is visible from a
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several
theories are advanced to justify this contention.
A

Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however,
does not protect citizens from all movies that might
offend; rather it singles out films containing nudity, presumably because the lawmakers considered them especially offensive to passersby.
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a variety of co11texts. See, e. g., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949'); Breard v. Alexander, 341
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974). See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L.
3 A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C § 1257 (2). See King
Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augu..~ta, 277 U.S. 100 (1928).

•'

·'
...,

:
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Rev. 153 ( 1972). Such cases demand delicate balancing
because
"[i]n th[e] sphere of collision between claims of
privacy and those of [free speech or] free press, the
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society."
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U . S . - , (1975),
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A
State or municipality may protect individual privacy
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content.
See Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech
on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See,
e. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728
(1970), 4 or the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See

.
..

l'

• Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be
"erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to instruct the Postmaster General to inform the sender that such mail is not to be
sent in the future. The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that
individual privacy is entitled to greater protection in the home
than on the streets and noting tha1· "the right of every person 'to
be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others
to cQmmtmicate." See id., at 736- 738.

-,

"\
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra.4
Justice Harlan cautioned·

5

But as Mr.

"The ability of government, consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a
showing that substant)al privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any
broader view of this authority would effectively employ a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21.
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, c0nstantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit
the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent
the narrow circumstances described above, 6 the burden
In Lehman the Court sustained a municipality's policy of barring
political advE'rtisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements
on city buses. The issue was whether the city lw.d created a ''public
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accept all advertising. While
concluding that no pubhc forum had been establishPd, both the
plurality and concurrmg opimons recognized that the degree of
cap6v1t~· and thE' resultant intruswn on privacy is significantly
greater for a passl'nger on a bus than for a per~on on the strl:'et.
See id., at :302 -304 (ovimon of MR .•JUHTICE BLACKMUN), and at
:306-308 (DouGLAS, L concurrmg). See also Public Utilities Cornm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U ::3.451,467 (1952) (DouoLAs, .T., dil:lSCnting).
6 lt ha ; also bPen suggestE'd that government may proscribe, by
a proper!) framrd law, "the willful use of scurrilous languagE' calculated to offend the senf3ibilities of an unwilling audience." Rose,,-,.
5

.•
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bom·
bardment of [hisl sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes." Cohen v. Cal1:jornia, 403 U. S., at 21. See also
Spence v. Washington,. 418 U. S. 405, 412 (1974) .
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies
solely on the basis of content. 7 Its effect is to deter
drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any
nudity, however innocent or even educational,S This
discrimination cannot be justified as a means of prevent-

.,•

,,
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PowELL, J., dissenting) .
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In such cases
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontation with the:
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Id., at 470. It may
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate
"verbal [or visual] assault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies
proscription. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) ..
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much.
less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellnnt manages a commercial enterprise which depends for its success on paying customers, not on freeloading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, thescreen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not
pay.
1 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a
book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller
v. California., 413 U. S., at. 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229'
(1972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind
of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws.
See Rot.'L v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (DoUGJ::AS, J.,
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that. the First Amendment permits nudity m p11blic places") . Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
8 Such a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppres-·
sion of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser
v. Randall, :357 U.S. 513, 518-·519 (1958). The record does not indicate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one·
('ase the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter milliorr
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In Theatre, inc. v. City of P(l{ledale.,
441 S. W. 2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969).
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise
protected speech on the basis of its content.

B
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to protect children. Appellee maintains that even though it
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence.
It is well settled that a State or municipality can
adopt more stringPnt controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629
(1968). Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U. S. 503 (196~)), and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances ma.y government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968).
ln this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed
against sexually explicit nudity nor is it otherwise
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films

.
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containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a
film containing a picture of ,\baby's buttOcks, the nude
body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might proscribe newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra. 9 Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any other governmental interest
pertaiuing to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as
to youths nor subJect to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them. In most circumstances/ 0 the values
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable
In Ginsberg the Court adopted a vanation of the adult obscenit y
standardH rn11ncmtrd in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957),
and Memoirs v Massachu.~etts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion) In Miller v California, sup·ra, we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs
tr::;t for judging obscenit)· with retiprct to adults. We have not had
occa~ton to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formu-.
lation. It IS rlrar, howevt>r, that under any test of obscenity as to
minors not. all nudtty would be proscribed. Rather, to be obscene
"such expres.~1on must be, m some sigmficant way, erotic." Cohen v.
California, 403 U. S., at 20. See Paris AduLt Theatre 1 v. Slaton,
413 u. S. 49, 106-107 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
10 The First Amendment nghts of minors are not "co-extensive·
With those of adults." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School DU3t., 393 U. S., at 515 (STEWART, J., concurring).
'rAJ state rna; permis~tbly d"trrmine that at least in some precisely
drlineated areas , a thild-like o<omeone in a captive audience-is not
po;;sessed of 1hat full capacity for individual cho1ce which 1s the
preHuppo~ition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S., at 64!)-650 (STEWAHT, J., concurrmg). In assessing
whether a minor has the requisite capacity for individual chmce
the age of the mmor 1s a ~ignificant factor. See Rowan v. Post Office;
/Jcet ., 397 U S., at 741 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).
9

•'
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when government seeks to control the flow of information
to minors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra. Cf. West Virginia /3d. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jacksonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression
accessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription.u

·.

c
At oral argument appellee, for the first time, sought
to justify its ordina.nce as a traffic regulation. It claimed
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing
the likelihood of accidents.
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed,
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from public places as well as public streets, thus indicating that
it is not a traffic regulation. But even if this were the
purpose of the ordinahce, it nonetheless would be invalid.
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to
think tha.t a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to violence,
would be any less distraeting to the passing motorist.
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a legislature may
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S.
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory
validity, however, has less foree when a classification
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all
else,' the First Amendment means that government hasno power to restrict expression because of its message,
:n See

P1Jrt III, iv.lra.
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its ideas, its subject matter, ot· its content." Police
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus,
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.) .
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) .
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of
any, for distinguishing movies containing nudity from
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance cannot be salvaged by this rationale.12

III
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on
its face. This Court has long recognized that a demonstrably overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. Nonetheless, when considering a facial challenge if is necessary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference with a state
regulatory program. In accommodating these competing interests the Court has held that a state statute
should not be deemed facially m valid unless it is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479. 497
12 This is not to r:-·ay that a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory
trafftc regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from
the v1ew of motorists "'ould not be a reasonable exercise of police
power. St>c Police Dept. of Chtcfl{Jo v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 98, and

..~S.e& cited..
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(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 012-615 (1973). See generally
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970).
In the present case the possibility of a limiting instruction appears remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing
to stay appellant's prosecution. 18 Moreover, thE! ordinance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a
narrowing construction. 14 Indeed, when the state courts
were presented with this overbreadth challenge they
made no effort to restrict its application. Compare
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613
(1971), and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449
(1969), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575576 (1941), and Chaplin~ky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particularly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifications for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no
reason to assume that th~ ordinance can or will be decisively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518,
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
F. S. 104, J11-112 ( 1972); 7'ime, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S.
374, 397 (1967).
n In this respect the presrnt case arises in a posture that differs
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this
Court Tvpically m ~nch ('ases the issue arises in a context where
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotected
actlVlty. Thus, we are able to consider the constitutionality of the
statute "as applied" as well as "on its faca."
14 The only narrowing construction which occurs to us would be
to hmit the ordiname to movtes that are obscene as to mmors
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a
limltatlon, perhap::< becau:'e a rewritmg of the ordinanee would be
DPCessury to reaeh that rc ... ult.
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Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is path
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters,
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves
and their employees they must either restrict their movie
offerings or construct adequa-te protective fencing which
may be ~expensive or even physically impracticable.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J. 1 dissenting).

IV
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of
Jacksonville. We hold only thttt the present ordinance
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression.
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent
here. Accordingly the judgment below is
Reversed ..

16

In this case appellan1 lumself is :1 theater manager. Hence the·
statute's deterrPnt effect ar·'s upon him personally; he is not seeking
to raise the hypvthetical ri~hts of o1hers. Sre Breard v. Alexander,,
~H lJ. 8. 1!22, 6.41 (1951) ..
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This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a
Jacksonvilk. Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing
films containin~ nudity by a drive-in movie theater when
its screen is visible from a public street or place.
I

Appellant, Richard Erznoznik, is the manager of the
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visib]P.
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January
14, 1972, provides:
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From
Public Streets or Public Places. It shall be unlawful
1 The movie, "Cia~s of '74," hnd been rated "R" by the Motion
Picture ARsorintion of America. An "R" rating indicate.'\ that youthR
may be admitted onl~r when accomprmied by a parent or guardian. Sre
~rcnerally Friedman, The Motion Pirture Rating Systrm of 1968: A
Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73
Col. L. Rev. 185 (1973). Although there is nothing in the record
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any
t icket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any
other person connected with or employed by any
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist
in exh ibiting, any motion picture. P11d e, or other exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide,
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or
public place. Violation of this section shall be punishable as a. Class C offense."
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor,
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate
dec]flr<ltorv nrtion. Tn that arti o•• appellee , the city of
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was
also testimony indicating that people had been observed
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked
cars and in the grass.
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate
excrf'ise of the municipulity's police power, and ruled that
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights.
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida,
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 ( 1974), relying exclusively on
ChPmline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721
(CAl) 1966). which had sustained a similar ordinance. 2
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks.
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this question reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatre$ Midwest
States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973).

,
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable
jurisdiction,3 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse.
II

Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains
that any movie containing nudity ·which is visible from a
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several
theories are advanced to justify this contention.
A

Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however,
does not protect citizens from all movies that might
offend; rather it singles out films containing nudity, presumably because the lawmakers considered them especially offensive to passersby.
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a variety of contexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Breard v. Alexander, 341
U. S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974). See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L.
A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). See King
Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 (1928).
8

~.
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Rev. 153 ( 1972).
because

"r i ln

Such cases demand delicate balancing

th l el !'ph ere of collision between claims of
privacy and those of free speech or] free press, the
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society."

r

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U. S. - , (1975).
i\ltho11gh e:wh caf'e ultimately mllst depend on its own
f'pecific facts, some general principlrs hnve emf'rgcd. .1\.
State or munieipalit? may protect individual privacy
hy enacting reasonablP time. plac<'. a.nrl manner regulations applicable to all speech irrcspcri ivc of content.
8cc Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiarw, 379 U.S.
536. 554 (1065): AdrlPrly v. Florida, :385 F. 8. 09 (1966).
Bnt wl1f'n tlw governnwnt. act.ing ac:; ccnf'or. nndertakrs
selPctivclv to shield the publir from some kinds of speech
on thr ground that they are more offemiYe thnn others.
tho First Amendment strictly limitR its power. See,
P. g., Police Deparhnent of Chicago v. MoslPy, 408 U.S.
92 (1972): Fowler v. Rhode Island, 041) F. S. 67 (1953);
Kovacs Y. Cooper, 336 r. S., at 07 (Jackson, J .. concurring). Such sol<'ctive restrictions have heen upheld
only when the :spenkcr intrndcs on the privacy of the
home. soc Rowan v. Post Office J)epl., 307 U. S. 728
(1!170) ,4 or the degree of captivity mnkes it impractical
for the unwilling viewPr or anditor to avoid exposure. See
Rowan invoh·ed a congressional st:ltute th::tt permits a person
receiving "a pandering adYcrtisement" which he believes to be
"eroticnlly arousing or se:\'1llllly provocntive" to instruct the Po~t
master Genernl to inform the sender that snrh mail is not to be
sent in the future. The Court UJlheld the statute, emphasizing that
individunl priYacy is entitled to gre:lter protection in the home
than on tho streetR ::md notinu: that "the right of eYery pen;on 'to
he let alone' mw•t be placed in the scaleR with the right of others
to communicate." See id., at 736-738.
4
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Lehman Y. City of Sha/;cr Heights, supra."
.T ustirc> Harlan cautioned:

5

As Mr .

"The ability of government. consonant with the
C:ont:titution. to shut off clil'rourse solrly to protect otlwrs from hearin~ it is ... clcpc>nrlent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaclrcl in an essentiallv intolerable manner. Any
hroaclrr vie"· of this mtthority would effectively employ a majority to silenre dissidents simply as a
matter of personal prrclilections." Cohen v. Califorml!, 403 U. 8., at 21.
The plain. if a.t times disquieting, truth is that in our
11lnralistiP- society, constantly proliferating new and ingc>Pious forms of exnre"'sion. "we arP inescapahlv rantive
nmlienreR for n1m1y purpol'es." Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 307 F. S .. at. nG. Murh that we rnrotmter
offends our esthetir. if n0t our politica 1 and moral. sensibilities. Nevertheless. the C'onstitution does not permit
the govrrnmcnt to derirle "·hirh typrs of othrnYi~e protcrterl sprrrh are sufllriently offppc:;ivr to require protrction for the unwilling listener or Yirwrr. Rather. absent
tlw narrow circumstances rlesrribrd abovr.G thr bnrrlrn
~In

J,ehman tlw Comt ~nstained .~ muniripnlitv'R polir:v of hnrring
whik llf'l'mit tir<e nonpoliti,.!1l nrlvNtiormrntR
on ritv hnor;'. Thr issue wn~ whether thr ri1v h:1d rrrnt0r! a "m1hlic
fnrnm" :1ni! thrrrlw nhliq~trd it srlf in ~rrr11t nll fldrrrtisim:. 1Vhilr
rnnrlnrlin" th::1t no pnhlir fornm hncl l)('rn rstflhlislwrl. h0th tlw
pJnrnJitY 11nr! ('f\J'rllfl'ill'! Ollininno l'f'r'Ognizrd th:1t thr O C''!f('(' of
rapt j,·itY n nrl tlw rr~nlt nn1 int rn"inn rn nri\'!1rY i~ siu:nifirantlv
:rrr:-~tf'T' fnr n D'lo<rn!!rr on : 1 h118 thnn for :1 prroon on thr strrrt.
8re ir1 .. r~t 102-104 (opinion of Mn . .T1T"1"C'l" BLM'TC\fTT"T). nnd at
10fi-10f~ (DoumA" . .T.. rrmrrrriprr) . S00 :1l.•n Publir Utilities C'nmm'n
v. Pnl/ak, :H1 TT. q. 451. 4fi7 (HHi2) (Dour.LA"l, .T., di;::<:rntinu:) .
r. It h'l~ nli'O lwrn Sll!!!!f'"trrl 1h:1t go\'rrnmrnt mnv nroorrihr, hy
a prnprrlY frnm"d lnw, "thr willful 11<:0 of <:rnrrilom: bngn'lgr rnlrulated to offend the sensibilitic<: of an unwilling flndicnce." Rosenpn1iti~ n l ~(h·rrt;~f'lTII'lltR
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [hi:- l sensibilities :::imply by averting [his]
eyes." Cohen v. California., 408 U. S .. at 21. See also
Spence v. TYashington, 418 U. S. 405. 412 (1974).
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminate:> among movies
solPlv on the basis of contC'nt. 7 Its cff~ct is to deter
drive-in theaters from showin!S 111ovies containing any
nurlitv. however innocent or cvC'n educationnP This
discrimination cannot he justified es a means of preventfe/d v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PowF.LL, J., dissenting).
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In such cases
the speaker may seek to "forrr p11blic confrontation with the
potentially offensive aspertB of the vvork." Id., at 470. It may
not bo tho content of the speerh, as much as the deliberate
"verb1l or visual] a~~ault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, thrtt justifies
prosrrip1ion. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
In the present case, howc,·er, appelhnt is not trying to reach, much
less shark, unwillinp; viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enterprise whirh depends for its snrcess on paying customers, not on freeloading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the
srrrm of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not
pay
7 Rrenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a
book. must be conRidered as a part of the whole \Vork. See Miller
v. California, 413 U. S., nt 24; Kois v. Wisconsin. 408 U. S. 229
(1972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind
of pnb 1 i ~ nudity traditionnlly subject to indecent. exposure bws.
Sec Rflth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DouGLAS, J.,
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public pluc·es"). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
8 Surh a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppression of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-519 (1958). The record does not indicate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million
dollars. Seo Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale,
441 S. W. 2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969).

r
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance
seeks only to keep these film.s from hcing flecn from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily
can avert his eyes. In short, the screcn of a drive-in
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 760 (1967). Thus, 'vc conclude that the limited privaey interest of personf' 011 the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise
protected speech on the basis of its r0111:r'nt.n

B
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to protect children. Appellee maintains that even though it
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity
to adults, the pref'!ent ordinance is a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence.
It is well settled that a State or municipality can
adopt more string0nt controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629
(1968). Nevertheless. minors are entitled to a significant me8"llre of First Amendment protection, see Tinke1·
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U. S. 503 (1969) , and only in relatively narrow :mel
well-defined circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968) .
o \Ve nrc not conrernrd in this rnse with n pro11crly drnwn zoning
ordiunnce restrictinp; the locntion of dri,·c-in thcntcrs or with n nondisrriminntory nuis~mrc ordinnnce drsigncd to protrrt the privacy of
persons in their hornet! from the Yisual and audible intrusions of RIICh
thentcrs.

l
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Tn this case, aPsuming the ordinance is aimed at pro·hibitinp; youths from viewing the films, the restriction is
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed
ngainst sexually ex1)licit nudity nor is it otherwise
Jimiterl. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasivencs~. Thus it would bar a
film containing a picture of :1 baby's buttocks, the nurle
borl.v of a war victim. or Rcenes from a culture in \vhich
nudity is inrlig<'nous. The ordinance also might prohibit ne\YF<reel scenes of t.hc opening of an art exhibit as
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly aU nudity
cannot he cleemcd obPc<'ne even ~ts to minors. ~ee G1'nsberg \'.New York, sU])ta. '" X or en n Purh a broad restriction be .iul"t ificcl by any other governmental interest
pertaining to 1ninors. Speech t.hat is neither 0bsrene as
to youths nor !'lnb.iect to some other legitimate 1)roscription can not be sum1resserl solely to protect the young
from icle~s or images that a lcgjplativc body thinks unRuitable for them. In n1oRt circumRtanres," the values
1n (Jin sbrra t hr C'ourt ado pied n ,·ari:tt ion of t hr adu!f ob,rrnity
rnnnrinte<l in Roth v. Unitrd Stntes, 354 U.S. 476 (Hl,17) ,
and MPrnoirs v. Massar·h11Srtts. 383 U. 8. 413 (1966) (pluralit~· opinion). In Miller v. Califomia. supm, wen bnndonPd the Roth-M ernoirs
iP~t for jnd~Ting obsrcnit~· with rrRpcrt to aclultR. We have not had
orr:1sion to deride what cfTcrt Millrr will hnvr on the Ginsberg formubtion. It iR dear. ho\YCYcr. thnt undrr :1n~ · trRt of obsrrnity us to
minors 11ot. nll nndit~· would hr proscribed. Rather, to br oh~rcnP
"snrh expre~<~ion mnRt hr, in Rome significant wa)', rrot ic." Cohrn Y.
California, 403 U. S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. STaton,
413 U. S. 49, 106-107 (1973) (BnENNAN, .T., diRscnting).
11
ThP Fir"t Amrnclmrnt rightR of minor.;; arr not "ro-rxtrn~ivr
with those of adults." Tinker v. Des Moinrs Independent Community Srhool Dist., 393 U. S., nt 515 (STEWART, J., roncurrinf!).
"[A] statr mn~· permiRRibbr dctrrmine thflt at lcnRt in some precisely
drliueatrd nrcaR, :1 rhilcl-likc Romconc in :1 captiw nnclicncr-i~ not
possrRRed of thnt full capnrity for individunl choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment gunrantees." Ginsberg v. New
10
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protected by the First Amendment are no lcs~ applicable
"·hen government seeks to control the flow of information
to minors. See 'Pi11ker v. D es ~Moines Independent Comrnun?ty Srhool Dist.. supra. Cf. TV est Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 310 U.S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jacksonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression
accessible to minorc.; it is ovPrbroacl in its proscription.' 2

c
At oral argument appelJee, for the first time. sought
to justif? its ordin::mce as a traffic regulation. It claimed
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing
motorists, thus slo,ving the flow of traffic and increasing
the likelihood of accidents.
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinnnce
suggests that it is airned at traffic regulation. Indeed,
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pnblic places as "·ell as public streets. thus indicating that
it is not a trn:ffic regulation. But even if this were the
purpose of the ordinance. it nonetheless wo11ld be invalid.
B:v singling out movi0s contnining even the n10st fleeting
and innocent glimpses of nudity the lPgislative classification is strikingly underinch1sive. There is r10 reason to
think that a wirlr vnri0tv of other scenes in the customary R~'reen diet. ranging from soap opera to violence,
''"mlld be any lm:s distracting to the pasE:ing motorist..
This Conrt freqncntly has uph0ld lll'dPrinclusivC' classifications on the sound throry that a legislature may
deal with one part of a 11robl0m "·ithout addressing all
of it. See. e. g., Will1'ams v. Lee Opt?'cal . Inc., 348 U. S.
483. 488-489 ( Hl55). This presumption of statutory
York. :390 U. R., nt G40-fl50 (STJc"I'.' I\HT, .T., romurring). In Hi'SE'~'~'ing
whrther a minor hn;;: tho rrqui'<itc cnparity for incli1·idunl choirc
thr :1ge of the minor i;;: a oignifirnnt factor. Scr Rowan v. Post Office
Dept .. 397 U. S., at 741 (DRENNAN, J., concurring).
1
~ ~cr P:~rt II[, infra.
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validity, however, has less force when a classific::ttion
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police
D ept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus,
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also
Cox v. Louisi.ana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.).
Cf. WWiams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Sh.apiro v.
Thompsorn, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of
any. for distinguishing movies containing nudity from
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance cannot b<' salvaged by this rationalc. 13

III
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on
its fnce. This Court has long recognizrd that a demonstrnbly overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. Nonetheless, when considering a facial challenge it is necessary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference with a state
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet1 3 This is not to say that a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory
traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable exercise of police
power. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 98, and
cases cited.

'.
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mg interests the Court has held that a state statute
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courtf'. see Dombro1uski v. Pfister, 380 U. 8. 479, 497
(1065), and its deterrent effect on legitimate rxprcseion
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (J 973). Sec gcnrrally
Note. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine. 83
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970).
Tn the presrnt case the possibility of a limiting conl"truction appNtrs remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing
to stay anpellant's prosecution. 14 l\1orcovcr. the ordina.nce by its plain t.erms is not easily susceptible to a
narrowing construction.'" Indeerl, when the state courts
\Vere presented Yvith this overbreadth challenge they
made no effort to restrict. its nnplication. Compare
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613
(1971), and Brandenburg v. Ohin. ~95 TT. S. 444, 448--449
(1969), with Cox v. l'lew Ham'{lshire. 312 U.S. 569, 575576 (1941), and Ch.'J,plinsky v. New H a.mpshire, 315 U. S.
568, 572-.C570 (1942). In thPse ,..i rcP mstaJlCes, partieularly where as here appellee offerR r(wera1 distinct jPstifica.tions for the ordinance in its bro .. rle"'t terms, there is no
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be deci14
In thi~ respect the present case nrises in a posture that differs
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a context where
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotecied
activity. Thus, we are able to consider the constitutionality of the
statute "as applied" as well as "on its face."
10
The only nnrrO\Ying construction which occur~ to us would be
to limit tho ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors.
NeiLhor appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a
limitation, perhaps because a rewriting of the ordinance would be
necessary to reach that. result.
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sivcly narro\\·ecl. Sec Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518,
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U. S. 104, 111-1 12 (1972) ; Time, Inc. v. Hnl, 385 U. S.
374, 397 (1967).
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters,
the owners ancl operators of these theaters are faced with
an umvclcome choice: to avoicl proscf'ution of themselves
and their employees they must either restrict their movie
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which
mn,y be extremely expensive or even physically im- J
prarticable. 1 r. Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. l\1acMullan,
406 U. S. 498, 513 (PowELL, J., dis~enting).

IV
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of
Jacksonville. \Ve hold only that the present ordinance
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression.
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent
here. Accordingly the judgment below is
Reversed.

JoIn this c::~sc :1ppcllnnt him~rlf i~ a theater man:1gcr. Hence the
statute's deterrent effect acts upon him perHonnlly; he is not seeking
to r::~isc the hypothetic::~! rights of other~. See Breard v. Alexander,

341 U.S. 622,641 (1951).
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MR. JusTICE PowEr..L delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a
Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing
film s containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when
its screen is visible from a public street or place.

I
Appellant, Richard Erznoznik. is the manager of the
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March
13, 1972, he was charged with violating ~ 330.313 of the
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January
14, 1972, provides:
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From
Public Streets or Publ·ic Place,~ . It shall he unlawful
1 Thr movit>, "ClaH;o; of '74,'' had been rafl'd "R" by the MoLion
Ptrture Assoeiation of America. An "R" rating iudicat(';o( thl).t youths
may be admittrd only when nccompnu:dd by a parrnt or guardian . S<m
grnerall~· Frirdman, The Motion Picture Rating Sy;:;tpm of 1968. A
Constitutionnl Analysis of SPlf-Regulntion by the Film Industry, 73
Col. 1•. Rev. 185 (1973) . Although there is nothing in the record
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any
other person connected with or employed by any
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide,
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or
public place. Violation of this section shall be pun,.
ishable as a Class C offense."
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor,
successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate
declaratory action. In that action appellee, the city of
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public
streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was
also testimony indicating that people had been observed
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked
cars and in the grass.
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights ..
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida,
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 (1974), relying exclusively on
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721
(CAS 1966), which had sustained a similar ordinance. 2
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes:
pictures of uncovered female brea::;ts and buttocks.
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this question reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theat1·es Midwest
~~tq,tes, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 {CA7 1973).
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dissenting. 294 So. 2d 93 (1974). We noted probable
jurisdiction/ 419 U. S. 822 (1974), and now reverse.

II
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Nevertheless, it maintains
that any movie containing nudity which is visible from a
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several
theories are advanced to justify this contention.
A
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect
its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinance, however,
does not protect citizens from all movies that might
offend; rather it singles out "films containing nudity, presumably because the lawmakers considered them especisJly offensive to passersby.
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors- in a variety of cuntexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949·); Breard v. Alexander, 341
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (19'11); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974). See generally Haima.n, Speech v. Privacy :
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N. W. U. L.
'•

A local ordinance is deemed a state statute for purposes of invoking this Court's jurisdictwn under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). See King
Manufacturing Co. v. Cit1.1 Council of Augusta, 277 U. S. 100 (1928) "
3
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Rev. 153 (1972). Such cases demand delicate balancing
because
" [i] n th [ e] sphere of collision between claims of
priva,cy and those of [free speech or] free press, the
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society."
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,- U . S . - , (1975).
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A
State or municipality may protect individual privacy
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content.
See Kovacs v. Cooper, s·upra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes
selectively to shield the p:.tblic from some kinds of speech
on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See,
e. g., Police Depa.rtment of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728
(1970)/ or the degree of captivity makes it impra.ctical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See
'Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be
"erotically arousing or s<'xually provocativt>" to instruct the Post~·
master General to inform the sender that tluch mail is not to be
sent in the future . The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that
individual privacy is entitled to greatt>r protection in the home
than on the streets and noting that "the right of every pertlon 'to
be let alone' must be placed in the srales w1th the right. of ot.hers;
tq, commu!licatf)." See idi., at 736,-7.38..
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra. 5
Justice Harlan cautioned:

5

As Mr.

11

The ability of government, consonant with the
Constitution~ to shut off discovrse solely to. protect ot,hers from hearing it is ... dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any
broader view of this authority would effectively employ a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21.
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit
the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent
the narrow circumstances described above, 6 the burden
5

In Lelmum the Court sustained a municipality's policy of barring
political advertisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements
on city buses. The issue was whether the city had created a "public
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accPpt all advertising. While
concluding that no public forum had been established, both the
plurality and concurring opinions recognized thl't the degree of
captivity and the resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly
greater for a paosenger on a bus than for a person on the street .
See id., at 302-304 (opinion of Mn . .lusTrcE BLACKMUN), and at
306-308 (DouGLAs, .T., concurring). See also Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 LT . S 451, 467 (1952) (DouGLAs, .T., dissenting).
6 It has also been suggested that. government may proscribe, by
:1 properly framed law, "the willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling audience." Rosetp.
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further born..
bardment of [hisl sensibilities simply by averting {his]
eyes." Cohen v. CaUfornia, 403 U. S., at 21. See also
Spence ·v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 412 (1974).
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies
solely on the basis of content} Its effect is to deter
drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any
nudity, however innocent or even educationaP This
discrimination cannot be justified as a means of preventfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901, 905 (PoWI!1LL, J., dissenting) .
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 38:~ U. S. 463 (1966). In such cases
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontatimi with the
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Jd., at 470. It may
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate
"verbal [or visual] assault," Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies
pro:::cription. See Redrup v. New Yorlc, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967).
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much
less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enterprise which depends for its success on paying rustomers, not on freeloading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the
screen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not
pay.
7 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a
book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller
v. California, 413 U. S., at 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229
(J 972). In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind
of public nudity traditionally snbject to indecent exposure laws .
See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DouGLAs, J.,
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment per~
mits nudity in public places"). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391
u. s. 367 ( 1968) .
8 Such a dett>rrent, although it might not result in total suppression of i hese movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 5.18-519 (1958) . The record does not indicate how rp.uch it would cost to block public view of appellant's
theater. Such cosh; generally will vary with circumstanr.es. In one
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In The.atre , Inc. v. City of Paged(lie,
441 S. W. 2d 5" 8 (M0i. 19:69}.
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ing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise
protected speech on the basis of its content.t~

B
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to protect children. Appellee maintains that even though it
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence.
It is well settled that a State or municipality can
adopt more stringent controls on communicative mate.rials available to youths tha.n on those available to
adults. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) . Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U. S..503 (1969), and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them. Ree, e. (!.,
Interstate Circuit, Inr:. v. City of Dallas, 390 U. S. 676
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968).
u We are not concerned in thi:; case with tt properly drawn ..::oning
ordinance re~;tricting the location of dnve-iu thraters or with a uondiscriminnt.ory nuisanee ordinnnce designPd to protect the privacy of
persons in their homes from the visual and audible intmRJons of such

theater:5.
,·
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In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed
against sexually explicit nudity nor is it otherwise
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of a.Il films
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a
film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude
body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See GinS'berg v. New Y ark, supra. 10 Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any othec governmental interest
pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, 11 the values
In Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of thP adult ob~cenity
stnnda.rdt> euunciatPd in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957),
and Memoits v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (pluralit~ opinion). In Miller v. Califotnia, supm, we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs
te~t for judging obscPnity with rP~pPct to adults. WP have not had
occaHion to decide what effect Mi:ller will have on the Ginsbetg fornllllation. H is dear, howPver, that undE-r an~· test of obscenity as to
miuor~ not all nudity would be pro~eribed. Hather, to be obHcene
"surb expreRsion must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v.
Califoruin. 1Da U. S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre l v. Slaton,
41;) t'. 8. !H, 106-107 (19i3) (BHEKNAN 1 ,f., di~sentmg).
11 The Fir81 Amendment rightf' of minor~ are not ' ' co-Pxtm~ivc·
with lhot>e of adults." Tinket v. De~ Moiues Independent Cornrnnnity Schoof Dist., 393 U. 8., at 515 (S'I'EWAH1', J., conrurring) .
"[A] state may perrmssibly detPrnune that at least in some preriRrly
de1iuratt•!l an'a8, a child--likE' someone in a raptive audience-i~ not
posseH8ed of that full capacity for individual choice which i~ the
pmmpposition of First AmendmenL guarantee,;." Gin;oben; v. New:
10
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protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable
when government seeks to control the flow of information
to minors. See Tinl.:er v. Des Moines Independe-nt Cqrnmunity School DtSt., supra. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jacksonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expressiOn
ac.cessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscriptjon:1'2:

.. ,

c
At oral argument appellee, for the first time, sought
to justify its ordinance as a traffic regulation. It claimed
that nudity on a drive-in movi~ screen distracts passing
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing
the likelihood of accirients.
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed,
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from pub~
lie places as well as public streets, thus indicating that
it is not a traffic regulation. But even if this were the
purpose of the ordinance, it nonetheless would be invalid.
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to
think tha.t a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera ta violence,
would be any less distracti;1g to the passing motorist.
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a legislature may
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S.
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory
York, :190 11. S., a.i 649-650 (S'l'BWAR'l', .1 , concurring). In a~~<t':sHing
whether lt minor has the reqmHit(' eapacity for individual l'hoice
the age of thf' minor 1s a t~i~nificant factor, See Rowan v. Post Office.
Dept ., :m7 U . S., at 711 (BRRNNA:-., .1., conrnrring).
;l~
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validity, however, has less force when a classification
turns on tl~e subject matter of expression. "[A]bove ali
else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus,
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendmeut itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also
v. L01.lisiana, 379 tJ. S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.).
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro 'V.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
Appellee offers I)O Justification, nor are we aware of
any, for distinguishing movies contal.ning
nudity from
I
other movies in a regulation designed to protect
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance can.::
not be salvaged by this rationale. 13

box

.-•

all

III
Even though n,one of th~ reasons advanced by appellea.
sustain the .J:apkson,v;ilte, p1;?tnan9e, it r~m~ins for u~
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on
its face. This Court has long recog11ized that a demon-:
strably overbroafl statute or ordinance may deter the
legitimate exercise. of First Amendment rights. Nonetheless, when considering a facial challenge it is necessary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference wi.th a state
regulatory program. In accommodating these compet-

~ill

•, •.

l 3 This is t~ot to say. ihl:lt a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory
traffic regulation requiring ~creening of driverin movie theaters from
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable .eN:ercise of poliGe
pq,wer. ~ee P()lice Dept. of Chicago v. MoBley, 408 U S., at 981 ~htL
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mg interests the Court has held that a state statute
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 497
(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (1973). See generally
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970).
In the preseut case the possibility of a limiting construction appears remot-e. Appellee explicitly joined in this
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing
to stay appellant's prosecution. 14 Moreover, the ordinance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a
narrowing construction. 15 Indeed, when the state courts
were presented with this overbreadth challenge they
made no effort to restrict its application. Compare
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613
(1971), and Brandenb·u.rg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449
(1969), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575576 (1941), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568. 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particularly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifica.tions for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be deci14

In this respect the present case arisPr: in a posture that differs
from most challenges to :'l. statute or ordinance considered by thb
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a eontext where
the statute or ordinance has been applied to all<'gedly unprotected
activity. Thus, we 11re able to eonsider the constitutionality of the
statute "as applied" as well as "on its facEJ . "
15 The only narrowmg construction which occurs to us would bt•
to limit the ordinancr to movies that are obscene as to minors.
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested snch n.
limitation, perhaps because a rewriting of the ordinance would ~
necessar:y to reach that .result.
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sively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518,
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U. S. 104, 111-112 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S.
374, 397 (1967).
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters,
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves
and their employees they must either restrict their movie
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which
may be extremely expensive or even physically impractica.ble.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,,
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J., dissenting).

IV
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not
deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of
Jacksonville. We hold only that the pi·esent ordinance
does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression.
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting 51-Hd clarity
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent
here. Accordingly the judgment below is
Reversed.
MR. JusTICE DorGLAS

,·

took no part in the consideration /

or decision of this case.

•,

111 In this case. appellant himself is a thPater manager.
Hence the·
statute's deterrent effcet. aetEr upon him personally; he is not seeking·
to raiRe the hypothetical rights of others. See· Brea.rd v. Alexander..
3,41 u. 8 . 622, 641 (1951).

.•

..

,.

.,

JU 1 ~

Page proof of syllabus ;;.s
approved.
' Lineup included.
Lineup still to be
added. Plea::;e senci
lineup to Print Shop
when n.vaibble an
NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) , will be re·
n, copy to me.
leased, as Is being done In connection· with this case, at the time 1
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but bas been prepared by the Reporter ot Decisions tor I linoth er copy of paae proof of
the convenience of the reader. See United Statea v. Detroit Lumber
s!fllabus as approved to
Oo., 200 U.S. 821, 837.
t

t/"

~how-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT i I

-

I

Syllabus

I

ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE \

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA,
FIRST DISTRICT

No. 73-1942. Argued Febmary 26, 1975-Decided June 23, 1975
A Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance making it a public nuisance and a
punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street
or place, is facially invalid as an infringement of First Amendment
rights. Pp. 3-12.
(a) The ordinance by discriminating among movies solely on
the basis of content has the effect of deterring drive-in theaters
from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or
even educational, and such censorship of the content of otherwise
protected speech cannot be justified on the basis of the limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets, who if offended
by viewing the movies can readily avert their eyes. Pp. 3-7.
(b) Nor can the ordinance be justified as an exercise of the
city's police power for the protection of children against viewing
the films. Even assuming that such is its purpose, the restriction
is broader than permissible since it is not directed against sexually explicit nudity or otherwise limited. Pp. 7-9.
(c) Nor can the ordinance be justified as a traffic regulation.
If this were its purpose, it would be invalid as a strikingly underinclusive legislative classification since it singles out movies containing nudity from all other movies that might distract a passing
motorist. Pp. 9-10.
(d) The possibility of a narrowing constmction of the ordinance
appears remote, particularly where appellee city offered several
distinct justifications for it in its broadest terms. Moreover, its
deterrent effect on legitimate expression in the form of movies is
both real and substantial. Pp. 11-12.
288 So. 2d 260, reversed.
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FIRST DISTRICT

No. 73-1942. Argued February 26, 1975-Decided June 23, 1975
A Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance making it a public nuisance and a
punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street
or place, is facially invalid as an infringement of First Amendment
rights. Pp. 3-12.
(a) The ordinance by discriminating among movies solely on
the basis of content has the effect of deterring drive-in theaters
from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or
even educational, and such censorship of the content of otherwise
protected speech cannot be justified on the basis of the limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets, who if offended
by viewing the movies can readily avert their eyes. Pp. 3-7.
(b) Nor can the ordinance be justified as an exercise of the
city's police power for the protection of children against viewing
the films. Even assuming that such is its purpose, the restriction
is broader than permissible since it is not directed against sexually explicit nudity or otherwise limited. Pp. 7-9.
(c) Nor can the ordinance be justified as a traffic regulation.
If this were its purpose, it would be invalid as a strikingly underinclusive legislative classification since it singles out movies containing nudity from aU other movies that might distract a passing
motorist. Pp. 9-10.
(d) The possibility of a narrowing construction of the ordinance
appears remote, particularly where appellee city offered several
distinct justifications for it in its broadest terms. Moreover, its
deterrent effect on legitimate expression in the form of movies is
both real and substantial. Pp. 11-12.
288 So. 2d 260, reversed.
I

HENRY PUTZEL, jr.
Reporter of Decisions.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

._

Although the Court pays lip service to the proposition that
11

each case ultimately must depend on its own facts,

11

ante, at 4, it

strikes down Jacksonville City Code § 330.313 by a mechanical application of

11

general principles 11 distilled from cases having little to do

with either this case or each other.

Because I can accept neither that

.•'

,·

approach nor its result, I dissent.
The Court's analysis begins and ends with the broad proposition
that, regardless of the circumstances, government may not regulate
any form of
certain

11

11

co:rhmunicative 11 activity on the basis of its content.

special circumstances,

11

Absent

we are told, the burden falls upon the

public to ignore offensive materials rather than upon their purveyor to
t~ke

steps to shield them from view.

Jacksonville's ordinance is of the

'•

general type proscribed by the first of these pronouncements and not
one of the few permitted by the latter; the Court therefore strikes it down.

.,

,{_.

,,

.·

- 2 None of the cases upon which the Cou rt relies r emotely implies
that the Court ever intended to establish inexorable limita ti on s u pon
state power in this area.

Many cases upheld the regu l ati on o f communi-

cative activity and did not purport to define the limits of the power to
do so.

~.

Lehman v. City of Shaker Height s, 41 8 U .S. 298 (1974);

Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Beard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

Other

cases relied upon by the Court were either expressly or impliedly
decided upon equal protection grounds and, although recognizing that
First Amendment interests were involved, turned upon

11

the crucial

question • • • whether there is an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment.
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 ( 1953).
requires particularized review.

11

Police Dept. of

See also Fowler v.

Such a standard necessarily

Finally, yet other of the cases cited

by the Court were decided on vagueness and overbreadth.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

~.

Again, application of these

doctrines requires scrutiny of the specific statute and activity
involved rather than reliance upon generalizations.

See,

~·,

379 U.S., at 544-58.
In short, nothing in this Court's prior decisions justifies its
present disregard of the admonition that ''the natu,~e of the forum and

I

- 3 the conflicting interests have rernz.ined im.portant in determining the
degree of protec tion affor ded by the [First] Amendment to the speech
in question."

Lehman v . C ity of Shake r Heights, 418 U.S . 298 ,

302-303 (1974) (plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Blackrnun).

Rather,

in applying this principle in contexts similar to the instant case, members
of this Court have cautioned that every medium of communication "is
a law unto itself,

11

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (opinion
.:,

of Mr. Justice Jackson), and that the ''tyranny of absolutes" should not
be relied upon " to meet the problems generated by the need to
accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in
compact modern communities.

11

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
.-..

U.S. 495, 518 (1952) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
A careful consideration of the diverse interests involved in this
case illustrates, for me, the inadequacy of the Court's rigidly simplistic
approach. In the first place, the conclusion that only a limited interest
of persons on the public streets is at stake here can be supported only

,

if one completely ignores the unique visual medium to which the
Jacksonville ordinance is directed.

Whatever validity the notion that

.,

passersby may protect their sensibilities by averting their eyes may
have when applied to words printed on an individual's jacket, see
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), or a flag hung from a secondfloor apartment window, · see Spence v. Washingtqn, 418 U.S. 405
,....,.

(1974), it distorts reality to apply it to the outsize screen of a drive-in
'"

movie theater.

Sucp screens are invariably huge; indeed, photographs

·.

- 4 includ ::d in the record of this case show that the screen of pe titioner's
theater dominated the view from several public plac es including
adjacent highways .

Mo reover, when films are proje cted on such

'•

screens the combination of color and animation against a necessarily
dark background is designed to, and has the effect of, attracting and
holding the attention of all observers.

See Note, Motion Pictures

and the First Amendment, 60 Yale L. J. 696, 707-708 (1951).

Similar

considerations led Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 ( 1932), to conclude that there is
a public interest in regulating billboard displays which may not apply
to other forms of advertising:
'Advertisements of this sort are constantly before
the eyes of observers on the streets and in street cars
without the exercise of choice or volition on their part.
Other forms of advertising are ordinarily seen as a
matter of choice on the part of the observer. The
young people as well as the adults have the message of
the billboard thrust upon them by all the arts and devices
that skill can produce. The radio can be turned off, but
not so the billboard or street car placard. These
distinctions clearly place this kind of advertising in a
position to be classified so that regulations or
prohibitions may be imposed upon all within the class. ' "
285 U.S., at 110.
11

So here, the screen of a drive-in movie theater is a unique type of
eye-catching display that can be highly intrusive and diverting.

Public

authorities have a legitimate interest in regulating such displays under
the police power, and even though traffic safety was not the only target
of the ordinance, I think it not unreasonable for lawmakers to believe

-----

·'

- 5 that public nudity on a giant scre en, v.i..:,i"'u:i.e to hundre ds of drivers of
automobiles, may have a tendenc y to diyert attention from the task at hand
and cause accidents.
No more defensible is the Court's conclusion that Jacksonville's
ordinance is defective because it regulates only nudity.

The significance

of this fact is explained only in a footnote :
11

Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude
persons in a book, must be considered as a part of the whole
work. In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from
nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. 11
Ante, at 6, n. 7.
;

Both the analogy and the distinction are flawed.

Unlike persons reading
·''

'·

books, passersby cannot consider fragments of drive-in movies as a part
of the

11

whole work 11 for the simple reason that they are not exposed to the

audio, an integral part of the medium, cf. Note, supra, at 707 and n. 27;
nor do drivers and passengers on nearby highways see the entire visual
display.

The communicative value of such exposure falls somewhere in the

range of slight to zero and, regardless of whether the ordinance involved
here can be loosely described as regulating the content of a certain type of

1/
display, it is not a restriction on any

11

message.

11

-

.·

Cf. Police Dept.

,.
1/
The record shows that the film from which appellant's
prosecution arose was exhibited in several in-door theaters in the
Jacksonville area, where all who viewed it and heard the dialogue on
headphones could consider the 11 work as a whole. 11 Moreover, the
ordinance does not preveht the owner of a drive-ip. movie theater from
exhibiting non-obscene films involving nudity so i6ng as he effectively
shields the -;creen from public view.

- 6 of C hic ago....-. Ivfosley , 408 U.S. 92, 95 -96 (1972); Grayned v . City of
Rockfo rd, 408 U . S . 104 , 11 5 (1972 ).

H ence, the First Amendment

interests 1nvol ved in this case are trivial at best.
A ssuming, arguendo, there could be a play performed in a the a ter
b y nude a c tors , involving genuine communication of ideas, the same
c onduct in a public park o r s treet could be prosecuted under a n ordinance
,,.·

prohi bi ting indecent exposure.

This is so because the police pow er has long

been interpreted to authorize the regulation of nudity in areas to whi ch all
members of the public have access, regardless of any incidental effect upon
communication.

A nudist colony, for example, cannot lawfully set up

shop in Central Park or Lafayette Park, places established for the public
generally.

Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973);

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas).

Whether such regulation is justified as· necessary to
-~·

protect public mores or simply to insure the undistracted enjoyment of open
areas by the greatest number of people, its rationale applies a fortiori to

giant displays which through technology are capable of revealing and

'

;'

emphasizing the most intimate details of human anatomy.
In sum, the Jacksonville ordinance involved in this case is narrowly
drawn to regulate only certain unique public exhibitions of nudity; it does
not suppress anyone's expression of ideas.

By conveniently ignoring

,,

..

' .,

.

~

.;.

'·

.~

''·

- 7 these facts and deciding the case on the basis of absolutes the Court
adds nothing to First Amenchnent analysis and sacrifices legitimate state
interests.

2/

I would affirm the judgment of the Florida Court of Appeals. -

,.,
·,·

.. ,
;

'•"'"

2 I
On my view of this case it is not necessary to deal with the
issues discussed in Parts II. B., II. C., and III of the Court's opinion.
This does not mean that I agree with its resolution of these issues.

,.,

Th§
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a
Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance that prohibits showing
films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when
its screen is visible from a public street or place.

I
Appellant, Richard Erznoznik, is the manager of the
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville. On March
13, 1972, he was charged with violating § 330.313 of the
municipal code for exhibiting a motion picture, visible
from public streets, in which "female buttocks and bare
breasts were shown." 1 The ordinance, adopted January
14, 1972, provides :
"330.313 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From
Public Streets or Public Places, It shall be unlawful
1 The movie, "Class of '74," had been rated "R" by the Motion
Picture Association of America. An "R" rating indicates that youths
may be admitted only when accompanied by a parent or guardian. See
generally Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A
Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73
Col. L. Rev. 185 (1973) . Although there is nothing in the record
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and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any
other person connected with or employed by any
drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare
pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide,
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or
public place. Violation of this section shall be punishable as a Class C offense."
Appellant, with the consent of the City Prosecutor,
·successfully moved to stay his prosecution so that the
validity of the ordinance could be tested in a separate
declaratory action. In that action appellee, the city of
Jacksonville, introduced evidence showing that the screen
of appellant's theater is visible from two adjacent public
·streets and a nearby church parking lot. There was
also testimony indicating that people had been observed
watching films while sitting outside the theater in parked
ears and in the grass.
The trial court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate
exercise of the municipality's police power, and ruled that
it did not infringe appellant's First Amendment rights.
The District Court of Appeals, First District of Florida,
affirmed, 288 So. 2d 260 (1974), relying exclusively on
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F. 2d 721
(CA5 1966), which had sustained a similar ordinance. 2
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, three judges
regarding the content of the movie, the parties agree that it includes
pictures of uncovered female breasts and buttocks.
2 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this ques~
tion reached a contrary result. See Cinecom Theatres Midwest
States, Inc . v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F . 2d 1297 (CA7 1973) .

.·
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dissenting. 294 So 2d 93 (1974) . We noted probable
jurisdiction,8 419 U. S, 822 (1974), and now reverse.

II
Appellee concedes that its ordinance sweeps far beyond
the permissible restraints on obscenity, see Miller v, California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and thus applies to films that
are protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U. S.153 (1974) . Nevertheless, itmamtains
that any movie containing nudity which IS visible from a
public place may be suppressed as a nuisance. Several
theories are advanced to justify this contention.
A
Appellee's primary argument is that it may protect
its citizens against unwEling exposure to materials that
may be offensive. Jacksonville's ordinanee, however,
does not protect citizens from all movies that might
offend; rather it singles out films con taming nudity, presumably because the lawmakers considered them especially offensive to passersby
This Court has considered analogous issues-pitting the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a variety of contexts. See, e. g., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Breard v. Alexander, 341
U.S. 622, 641-645 (1951); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) ; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) . See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy :
Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To? ~ 67 N W. TJ L.
8

A local ordinance 18 deemed a stat e statute for purposes of invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) . See King
Manujacturi11{1. Co, v City Co'(.lncil of A1lgusta, 277 U S. 100 (1928).
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Rev. 153 (1972) , Such cases demand delicate balancing
because
" [i] n th [ e] sphere of collision between claims of
privacy and those of [free speech or] free press, the
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society/ 1
Cox Broadca.<;ting Corp v Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 491
(1975).
Although each case ultimately must depend on its own
specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A
State or municipality may protect individual privacy
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content,.
s ·ee Kovacs v. Cooper, supra; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
536, 554 (1965); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966) .
But when the government, actmg as censor, undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech
on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. See,
e-. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring). Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the priv.acy of the
home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728
(1970)/ or the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See
• Rowan involved a congressional statute that permits a person
receiving "a pandering advertisement" which he believes to be
''erotically arousing or sexually provocatJve" to inskuct the Postmaster General to inform the sender that such mail is not to be
sent in the future. The Court upheld the statute, emphasizing that
individual privacy is entitled to greater protectio•n in the home
than on the streets and noting that "the right of ·~very person 'to
be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of othel'$
to comm11nicate/'' See id:, at 736-738.

.

.
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Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra. 5
Justice Harlan cautioned ·

o
As Mr.

"The ability of government, cor..sonant with the
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it IS •• • dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests a1·e being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any
broader view of this authority would effectively employ a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21.
Constitution~

The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, co'lstantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably captive
audiences for many purposes." Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U. S., at 736. Much that we encounter
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit
the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent.
the narrow circumstances described above, 6 the burden
6 In Lehman the Court sustained a mumcipality's poliry of barring
political advertisements while permitting nonpolitical advertisements
on city buses. The issue was whether the city had created a "public
forum" and thereby obligated itself to accept all advertising. While
concluding that no public forum had been established, both the·
plurality and concurring opinions recognized that the degree of
captivity and tbe resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly
greater for a passenger on a bus than for a person on the street.
See id., at 302-304 (opinion of MR. JusTICE BucKMUN}, and at
306-308 (DoUGLAS, J ., concurring) See also Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U S 451 , 467 (1952) (DouGLAS, J , dissenting)
6 It has also been suggested that government may proscribe, by
a properly framed law, "the willful use of scurrilous language calcu)atcl tQ oJfelld tile smsibilities of an unwilling audience." R08er~P-
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normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting :[his]
eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U. 8., at 21. See also
Spenie v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 412 (19·74).
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies
solely on the basis of content/ lts effect Is to deter
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U . S. 901, 905 (PowELL, J., dissenting).
Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U S. 463 (1966) . In such cases
the speaker may seek to "force public confrontation with the
potentially offensive aspects of the work." Id, at 470. It may
not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate
"verbal [or visuai] assault;'' Rosenfeld, supra, at 906, that justifies
proscription. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967).
In the present case, however, appellant is not trying to reach, much
, less shock, unwilling viewers. Appellant manages a commercial enterprise which depends for its success on paying customers, not on freeloading passersby. Presumably, where economically feasible, the
screen of a drive-in theater will be shielded from those who do not
pay.
7 Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures 0f nude persons in a
'book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. See Miller
·v. California, 413 U. S., at 24; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229
(1972) . In this respect such nudity is distmguishable from the kind
of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 512 (1957) (DoUGLAS, J .,
disseuting) ("No one would suggest that the First Amendment permitt'! nudity in public places") . Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391
367 (1968) .
THE CHIEF JusTicE's dissent, in response to this point, states
that "[u]nlike persons reading books, passersby cannot consider
fragments of drive-in mov1es ai:i a part of the 'whole work' for the
simple rea,;on that they see but do not hear the performance, ..."
Post, at 4 (emphal::IIS in 01'1ginal). At i:>sue here, however, is not
the vwwing nghts of unwilling Vll'\''erl::l but rather the nghts of
those who operate drivt>-in theatres and the public that attendsthese e&tablishmentb. The effect of the Jacksonville ordinance is
to increast> the cost of ohowmg films contammg nudity ln certain
circumstances theatres w1ll avoid showmg th~se movies rather than
incur the add1tional cost~ As a result persons who want to ::;ee. :ttch film:,; at drive-ms will be unable to do RO. See n 8, infra. lt

u.s.
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drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any
nudity, however mnocent or even educational.8 This
discrimmation cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance
seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily
can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in
theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." Redrup
v. New YMk, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) . Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise
protec\ied speech on the basis of its content.9
B
Appellee also attempts to support the ordinance as
an exercise of the city's undoubted police power to protect children. Appellee maintains that even though it
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence.
It ls well settled that a State or municipality can
it! in this regard that u motion piCture must be considered a, a \
whole, and not as isolated fragment;; or beenes of uudlt)
8 Such a deterrent, although it might not result in total suppression of these movies, is a restraint on free expression. See Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-519 ( 1958). The record does not indicate how much it would cost to block public view of appellant's
theater. Such costs generally will vary with circumstances. In one
case the expense was estimated at approximately a quarter million
dollars. See Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc . v City of PagedalP.,
441 S. W. 2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969)
9 We are not concerned in th1s case with a properly drawn zoning
ordinance restricting the location of dnve-in theaters or w1th a nondiscriminatory nuisance ordmance des1gned to protect the privacy of
persons in their homes from the v1sual and audible intrus10ns of sue}}
theaten,.

,-
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adopt more stringf'nt controls on communicative mate~
rials available to youths than on those available to
adults. See, e, g., Ginsberg v. New Y m·k, 390 U. S. 629
(1968). Nevertheless, minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, see Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist,,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them. See, e. g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of DallM, 390 U. S. 676
(1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U. S. 462 (1968).
In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing the films, the restriction is
broader than permissible. The ordinance is not directed
against sexually explicit nudity, uor is it otherwise
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films
containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a
film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude
oody of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which
nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit a.~
well as shots of bathers on a beach. Clearly all nudity
cannot be deemed obstlene even as to minors. See Gins. b~g v. New York, supra.10 Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any other governmental interest
In Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of the adult obt:.cenity
standards enuumated in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) ,
and Memoirs v. Massachmetts, 383 U. S 413 (1961'\) (plurality opinion) . In Miller v California, supra, Wf' abandoned the Roth-Memoir&
test for judging obscenity with re:5pect to adult!>. We have not had
occasion to decide what effect Miller w1ll !.ave on the Gtnsberg formu~
lation. It is clear, however, that under any test of obscenity as to
minor8 not all nudity would be pro~:~cnbed. Rathel, to be obscene
"such expression must be, in :5ome significant way, erotic " Cohen v.
California, 403 U S., at 20. See Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton,
41:3 U. S. 49, 106~107 (1973) (BHENNAN1 J, disl:lenting).
10
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pertaining to minors. Speech that is neithet· obscene as
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate ·proscrip~
tion cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances,11 the values
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable
when government seeks to control the flow of information
to minors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com..
munity School Dist., s,upra. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Thus, if Jack~
sonville's ordinance is intended to regulate expression
ac.cessible to minors it is overbroad in its proscription.1.2

c
At oral argument appellee, ior the first time, sought
to justify its ordinance as a traffic regulation. It claimed
that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing
motorists, thus slowing the flow of traffic and increasing
the likelihood of accidents.
Nothing in the record or in the text of the ordinance
suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation. Indeed,
the ordinance applies to movie screens visible from public places as well as pubhc streets, thus indicating that
it is not a traffic regulatiOn. But even If this were the
purpose of the ordinance, it nonetheless would be invalid.
The First Amendment rights of minor~ are not "co-·extensive
with those of adults." Tinker v Des Moines Independent C(}171-o
munity School Dist., 398 U. S., at 515 (S'l'EWART, J ., concurring) .
"[A] state may permissibly determine that at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child-like oomeone m a capt1ve audu·nce-is not
possessed of that full rapacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U. S., at 649-650 (STEWART, J ,, concurrmg) . In assessing
whether a minor hao the reqmoite capacity for individual choice
the age of the minor is a sigmficant faetor. See Rowan v Post Office
Dept., 397 U. S , at 741 (BHEN NAN, .T., concurrmg).
12 See Part III, infra.
11
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By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting·
and innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classifi~
tion is strikingly underinclusive There is no reason to
think that a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to violence,
would be any less distracting to the passing motorist.
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive cla,s..
sifications on the sound theory that a legislature may
deal with one part of a problem without addressing all
of it. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S.
483, 488-489 (1955) . This presumption of statutory
validity, however, has less force when a classification
turns on the subject matter of expression. "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendlilent means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content/' Police
Dept. of Chicago v. M os~ey, 408 U. S., at 95. Thus,
"under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendment itself," id., at 96, even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless
there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S., at 581 (opinion of Black, J.).
Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of
any, for distinguishing movies containing nudity from
all other movies in a regulation designed to protect
traffic. Absent such a justification, the ordinance canQ
not be salvaged by t.his rationale.13
This is not to say that a. narrowly dra\'\-'11 nondiscriminatory
traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in movie theaters from
the view of motorists would not be a reasonable exercise of police·
power. See Police Dept. of ChicagCI v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 98, and.
cases cited.
18

'3'3-1942--0PTNION

ERZNOZNIK v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

l!.ll

III
Even though none of the reasons advanced by appellee
will sustain the Jacksonville ordinance, it remains for us
to decide whether the ordinance should be invalidated on
its face. This Court has long recognized that a demonstrably overbroad statute or ordinance may deter the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. Nonetheless, when considering a facial challenge it is necessary to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference with a state
regulatory program. In accommodating these competing interests the Court has held that a state statute
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 497
(1965), and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression
is both real and substantial. See Broadrick v. Oklo,.
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 612-615 (1973). See generally
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970).
In the present case the possibility of a limiting construction appears remote. Appellee explicitly joined in this
test of the facial validity of its ordinance by agreeing
to stay appellant's prosecution.a Moreover, the ordinance by its plain terms is not easily susceptible to a
narrowing construction.15 Indeed, when the state courtR
14 In this respect the present case arises in a posture that differs
from most challenges to a statute or ordinance considered by this
Court. Typically in such cases the issue arises in a context where
the statute or ordinance has been applied to allegedly unprotected
activity Thus, we are able to r.onsider the constitutionality of the
statute "as applied" as well as "on its face."
15 The only narrowing construction which occurs to us would be
to limit the ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors.
Neither appellee nor the Florida courts have suggested such a
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were presented with this overbreadth challenge they
m.ade no effort to restrict its application. .Compare
Coa,tes v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612-613
(1971), and Bra,ndenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-449
(1969), with Cox y. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575576 (1941), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S.
568, 572-573 (1942). In these circumstances, particularly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifications for the ordinance in its broadest terms, there is no
reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be decisively narrowed. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518,
520-527 (1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U. S. 104, 111-112 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S.
374, 397 (1967).
Moreover, the deterrent effect of this ordinance is both
real and substantial. Since it applies specifically to all
persons employed by or connected with drive-in theaters,
the owners and operators of these theaters are faced with
an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution of themselves
and their employees they must either restrict their movie
offerings or construct adequate protective fencing which
may be extremely expensive or even physically impracticable.16 Cf. Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan,
406 U. S. 498, 513 (POWELL, J., dissenting) .

..

'

'

.

IV
In concluding that this ordinance is invalid we do not
·deprecate the legitimate interests asserted by the city of
Jacksonville. We hold only that the present ordinance
limitation, perhaps because a rewrith1g of the ordinance would be
necl',ssary to reach that. result.
16 In this case appellant himself is a theater manager. Hence the
statute's deterrent effect acts upon him personally; he is not seeking
to raise the hypothetical nghts of others. s('C Brearrl v Alexandria,..
.341 U. S. 622,641 (l!l51).
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does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression.
Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity
of purpose are essential. These prerequisites B.re absent
here. Accordingly the judgment below is
Reversed.

